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HIERARCHY-BASED ACCESS CONTROL IN DISTRIBUTED ENVIRONMENTS
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Abstract. Access control is a fundamental concern in any system that manages resources, e.g., operating systems, file systems,
databases and communications systems. The problem we address
is how to specify, enforce, and implement access control in distributed environments. This problem occurs in many applications
such as management of distributed project resources, e-newspaper
and payTV subscription services.
Starting from an access relation between users and resources,
we derive a user hierarchy, a resource hierarchy, and a unified hierarchy. The unified hierarchy is then used to specify the access
relation in a way that is compact and that allows efficient queries.
It is also used in cryptographic schemes that enforce the access relation. We introduce three specific cryptography based hierarchical
schemes, which can effectively enforce and implement access control and are designed for distributed environments because they do
not need the presence of a central authority (except perhaps for setUP).
Keywords: Distributed access control, access hierarchies, information and communication security.
Note: This work was conducted when G . Noubir and J.-C. Birget
were visiting the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. J.-C. Birget and
B. Ramamurthy were supported in part by NSF grants.

1. INTRODUCTION
The domain we consider in this paper is that of distributed applications in environments such as distributed operating systems, distributed database systems, and communication networks where different users access different resources with different access rights.
This problem is called distributed access control. Typical examples
include access to rooms (e.g., class and lab) in a building, management of project resources, e-newspaper and payTV subscription
services.
For example, in the context of management of project resource,
users include directors, group leaders, project managers, technical
managers, engineers, consultants, administrative staff, customers
and accounting staff. Resources include financial data, intemal
technical documents, public project documents, laboratories, etc.
Different users have different access rights to different resources,
which need to be concisely specified and correctly enforced.
Access control deals with the specification and enforcement of
users’ access permissions (and access restrictions) relative to the
resources of a system. This is a fundamental concern in any system that manages resources, e.g., operating systems, file systems,
databases and communications systems. Traditionally, access control is specified by an access relation (or “access matrix”) that lists
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explicitly which users can access which resources.
In this paper we uncover a user hierarchy and a resource hierarchy, that are implicit in any access relation. Intuitively the hierarchies arise from the fact that some users have more access rights
than others, and some resources carry more access constraints than
others (a formal definition will be given later). We show that these
hierarchies can give useful information.
Another contribution of this paper is an algorithm that merges
these implicit user and resource hierarchies into a single hierarchy.
This unified hierarchy contains the user and resource hierarchy as
sub-hierarchies; moreover, a user is above a resource in the unified
hierarchy if and only if this user has access to this resource. Thus
the unified hierarchy contains all the information of the access relation, while also displaying the useful hierarchy information. In addition, the unified hierarchy merges ‘equivalent’ users, and merges
‘equivalent’ resources (rigorous definitions will be given); thus the
unified hierarchy will usually be a compact description of the access
rights.
Having a unified hierarchy can simplify access control. The
literature contains secure access control protocols [I, 3, 6, 8, 101
that assume (without justification) that we have such a pre-existing
unified hierarchy (see Subsection 3.4). We show how various secure
access control schemes make use of hierarchy information in order
to enforce access permissions and restrictions.
For a centralized system, access control is usually implemented
by a centrally stored access table [2, 5, 7, 11, 121. However, applications in distributed environments call for distributed access control (e.g., networks, Intemet, distributed databases, web services,
distributed operating systems, satellite-TV, etc.). In Section 3 we
give access control schemes that are specifically designed for distributed applications.
In this paper we do not consider the dynamics of access control
(when users and resources are added and removed and when access
rights change). Our results are applicable when systems change
only slowly. Dynamical distributed access control is a very difficult
problem that does not have easy solutions. We have been studying
the problem by beginning with restricted domains and have proposed some dynamic hierarchical access control schemes for specific applications fields such as tree-hierarchies and secure group
communications [ 131.
To illustrate the hierarchies we will use the following simple
example, inspired from a college environment. The users, the resources, and the access relation (user-dominant adjacency lists) are
given as follows (see box). We will derive a unified hierarchy for
these relations in Section 2 .
In the next section we define the user and resource hierarchies
as well as the unified hierarchy and prove the existence and uniqueness of the unified hierarchy. In Section 3, we discuss the speci-
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fication of an access relation (in particular, using the unified hierarchy) and introduce three cryptography based schemes which enforce the access relation; these schemes use the unified hierarchy
and are specifically designed for distributed applications.

now on, when we say “user” (or “resource”), we will mean a group
of equivalent users (respectively, resources). The set of users U, the
set of resources R, and the access relation A will refer to groups
from now on.

Example: For our example from the Introduction, the Figures 1 and
2 represent the user and the resource hierarchies with several m e g ers between users and resources, obtained from the access relation.

prof1 c l , clA, c3, labl, lab2, prl, pr2
prof2 -+ c2, c3, labl, lab2, prl, pr2
grStul
clA, c3, labl, lab2, pr2
grStu2 -+CIA, c3, labl, lab2, pr2
ugrStul
c3, labl, lab2, pr2
ugrStu2
c3, labl, lab2, pr2
-+

-+

-+

-+

ugrStulOO -+c3, labl, lab2, pr2
secr -+ c3, prl, pr2
sysMgr -+ all resources
sysHelp -+ all resources except c l and c2

2. IMPLICIT HIERARCHIES IN AN ACCESS RELATION
A hierarchy is formalized by a directed acyclic graph
(DAG), which defines a partial order (“hierarchical order”) among
vertices. A vertex vi is below a vertex vJ in the hierarchical order
(vi 5 vj) if and only if there exists a directed path in the graph
from vj to vi.
Let U = { U I ,u2, . . . } be the set of users in the system, and
let R = { T I , T Z : . . . } be the set of resources in the system. The
access relation A of the system determines which resources each
user can legally access and use:
A = { ( U ,r ) E U x R : the user U can access the resource r } .
For a user U E U , let R(u) C R denote the set of resources that
U can access; for a resource r 6 R , let U ( r ) C U denote the set of
users that can access r . So, ( U , r ) E A is equivalent to T E R(u),and also equivalent to U E U ( T ) .In the following, we assume that
the complete access relation is known, and hence all the sets R(u)
and U ( T )are known.
The user and resource hierarchies are defined as follows:

Definition 1. Let ui,uj E U , ri, rj E R.
ui <U uj ifand only i f R ( u i ) R ( u j ) (i.e., ui is below uj
in the user hierarchy if and only if the resources that ui can access
form a subset of the resources that uj can access).
ri < R rj ifand only i f U ( r j ) C U ( r i ) (i.e., T ? is below rj in
the resource hierarchy ifand only ifevery user that can accessrj
can also access rz).
ui EU uj ifand only i f R ( u i ) = R(uj); so, two users are
equivalent (regarding access control) ifand only ifthey have exactly
the same access rights.
ri E R r j ifand only i f U ( r i ) = U ( r j ) ; so two resources are
equivalent (regarding access control) if and only if they are accessible by exactly the same users.
Note that the subset order is reversed for resources, compared
to users.
The ‘order’ relations defined so far are in general not antisymmetric (i.e., z 5 y and z 2 y does not imply z = y; see e.g.,
[4]). To obtain partial orders we merge equivalent (ZU) users
into single groups, and we merge equivalent resources into single
groups. Note that the result is the same, whether we first merge
equivalent users, and then equivalent resources, or vice-versa. From
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Figure 1 : User hierarchy

Figure 2 : Resource hierarchy
Now (after merging equivalent users, and merging equivalent
resources), the users form a partial order (P.o.), called the user hierarchy, and denoted by (U,
similarly, the resources form a
p.o., called the resource hierarchy, and denoted by (R,
5 ~ ) .
We will now combine the user hierarchy and the resource hierarchy into a unified hierarchy, defined as follows:

s~);

Definition 2. Let (U,< U ) and ( R ,< R ) be p.0.s (user hierurchv,
resource hierarchy respectively), obtained from an access relation
A. The unified hierarchy is a p.0. (V,5 ) satisfiing the following
conditions:
( 1 ) The user hierarchy is a sub-p.0. of the unified hierarchy; this
means: ( U ,< U ) is embedded into the p.0. (V,3 ) by a one-to-one
map f~ : U -+ V , such that for all ui, I L ~E U : ui <U uj ifand
onz?JiffU(ui)5 f U ( U j ) .
( 2 )Similarly, the resource hierarchy is a sub-p.0. of the uniJied
hierarchy; this means: ( R ,< R ) is embedded into the p.0. (V,5 )
by a one-to-one map f R : R -+ V , such that for all r i , r j E R :
ri I Rr j ifand only i f f ~ ( r i5) f ~ ( ~ j ) .
(3)A user U E U has access to a resource T E R if and only if
U is above T in the unijied hierarchy; thus, U has access to r if and
o n l y i f f R ( r )5 f u ( u ) .
( 4 ) Thep.0. (V,
5 )is the sma1lestp.o. (regarding the size ofV),
satisfying (I), (2), (3).

+

(V’I to be smaller than ( U ( IRI, the embedding maps must identify
some u E U with some r E R: & ( U ) = fk(r)(E V’).
Since & ( U ) = fk(r) we conclude that u can access r (by (3) of
Def. 2), and hence {r3 E R : r3
r } R(u).
On the other hand, if u can access some resource r3 then (again by
point (3) of Def. 2), f & ( r 3 )5 fL(u)(= f & ( r ) ) .Hence (by point
(2) of Def. 2), r j <R r. Therefore,
R(u) {r3 E R : r j < R r } .
The two set-inclusions imply:
If f&(u)= f & ( r )then R(u) = {r3 E R : rg I Rr } .
Then it follows from the Lemma above, that u and r are also identified in our construction of V above. So, our construction of V
makes every identification that any minimum-size unified hierarchy
V’will do, so our construction is of minimum-size too.
Uniqueness also follows: different minimal unified hierarchies
can only differ in the way uz’s are identified with r3’s. But the
Lemma tells us that this can only be done in one way.
This proves the Theorem. 0
The definition of the unified hierarchy does not tell us explicitly
what it means for a resource to be above a user u 5 r). From the
construction one can derive the following (and the proof is straightforward):

The following theorem shows that a unified hierarchy, as just
defined, exists and is not larger than the combined size of the two
original user and resource hierarchies.
We will use the notation x y to mean y 5 2.

Theorem 1. For any user hierarchy ( U , <U) (a p.0.) and any resource hierarchy ( R ,
(a p . ~ . )there exists a uniJed hierarchy
(V,
5 ) (a p.0. as defined above), and this p.0. is unique up to ‘isomorphism’ (i.e., up to renaming the elements of V ) .For the size IVI
ofV we have: JVI 5 IUI lRJ.
Moreovel; (V,5 )can be constructedfrom ( U ,5 U ) and ( R , R
) in polynomial time.

s ~ )
+

c

<

Proof. We use the classical notation 2 R for the set of all subsets of
R. We will construct the unified hierarchy (V, 3)as a sub-p.0. of
the p.0. ( z R ,G).(Analogously, we could have based the construction on 2 u , which would have been quite similar.)
( 1 ) We embed the user hierarchy ( U ,< U ) into (2”, C_) by the map
fu : E U -+ fu(ui)= R ( w ) E 2R.
(So, f ~ ( u i consists
)
of the resources that ui can access.) Then fu
is one-to-one (since we merged equivalent users), anduz $I u j if
and only if f u ( u i ) G fu(uj)(by the very definition of < U ) .

(2) We embed the resource hierarchy ( R ,5 ~into) the p.0. (aR, C)
by the map f~ : ri E R
f ~ ( r i=
) { r j E R : rj S R ri}.
Then f~ is one-to-one (because
is a P.o.), and ri <R rj if and
)
because < R is a p.0.).
only if f ~ ( r % )f ~ ( r j(again
----f

Proposition In the unified hierarchy the following are equivalent
(where u is a user and r is a resource):
u 5 r;
every resource accessible by u is < R r ;
every user of r is
U;
for every user U %of r and every resource r j accessible by u we
have: ui can access r j ;
the Cartesian product U ( T )x R(u)is a subset of A.

s~

c

(3) The third condition of the definition then holds: ui can access rj
if and only if r j E R(u,) if and only if ( h k I Rr j ) r k E R(ui)
if and only if f ~ ( ~ j fr~(u~).
)
Let V = {tu(.) : u E U } U { ~ R ( T:)r E R } & 2R. Then the
p.0. (V,C)satisfies conditions (l),(2), (3) of the definition (with C
playing the role of 5).
Also, clearly IV/ IUI
IRI.
It is easy to implement the construction of (V,5 )in polynomial
time; note that we need not consider all of 2 R in the construction.
Minimality of (VIand uniqueness of the minimal unified hierarchy will follow from the following lemma.

<

Example: For the example of the Introduction, Figure 3 represents
the unified hierarchy. Note that some users have been merged with
resources.

+

Lemma: For any minimal unified hierarchy (V, 5 ) obtained from
(U,< U ) and ( R ,< R ) , with embedding maps fu and f~ we have:
f u ( u i )= f ~ ( r jif)and only if R(ui) = { r k : r k < R r j } .

ugrStul
U rStulW

Proof of the Lemma: By the definition of the unified hierarchy,
fu(u,)= f ~ ( r jif) and only if ui can access rj (and hence the
descendants of r j ) , and no other resources (if ui could access another r k , then f ~ ( ~=j fu(ui)
)
? f ~ ( r k )hence rj > R r k ) . This
proves the Lemma.
Minimality of our construction then follows: Indeed, from the
definition, V must contain U and R (via one-to-one maps). To
make IVI smaller than IUI+ [RI,the embedding maps must identify
some ui’swith some rj’s. But the Lemma tells us a necessary and
sufficient condition for this to happen. In our construction based
on 2 R , all these possible identifications do happen, hence IV/ is
minimal.
Now we can also prove that our construction has minimum size:
Let V’be any minimum-size unified hierarchy containing copies of
U and R (via embedding maps
fk),according to Def. 2. For

Figure 3: Unified hierarchy

3. IMPLEMENTATIONOF ACCESS CONTROL
In this section we use the hierarchies that we introduced in order to
develop secure access control schemes. Hierarchies can be used for
both the specification and the enforcement of access control. In our
enforcement schemes, a user uZhas to prove to a resource rj that ui
has the right to access r j , and this should be possible if and only if
rj 5 ui with respect to the unified hierarchy. We will present three

fL,
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basic means to enforce access control: certificates, unconditionally
secure keying schemes, and computationally secure keying schemes
(based on one-way functions).
3.1. Specification of access control
An access control relation can be given explicitly, by an access matrix, which can be useful for theoretical reasonings but is wasteful
for space. A more compact description of the access control relation can be given by adjacency lists: user-dominant adjacency lists
or resource-dominant adjacency lists.
The un@d hierurchv can also be used to describe the access relation. In this case, the hierarchy is given as a graph in which every
vertex is labeled by the set of equivalent user:; or resources (or some
of both) that are represented by this vertex. Because of the merger
of equivalent users or resources, and the merger of some users with
some resources, the unified hierarchy is a representation which is as
compact as (and usually more compact than) the adjacency list representation. Moreover, the unified hierarchy has the advantage that
certain queries are more efficient: Given a u:jer ui or a resource rj
it is easy to find the adjacency list of ui or rj (namely, pick all the
resources that are 5 ui,respectively, all the: users that are t rj).
In the user-dominant adjacency list representation, it is tedious to
find a resource’s adjacency list; on the other hand, if both userand resource-dominant adjacency lists are explicitly given, storage
is wasted. In the rare cases when no mergers occur, the unified hierarchy loses its compactness advantage (however, one still has to
consider the concepts and go through some of the construction of
the unified hierarchy, in order to find out that no users are merged
with resources). In any case, the unified hierarchy keeps an advantage regarding queries. Thus, the unified hierarchy could serve as
a representation of the access relation, which is both compact and
efficient for queries.
Various mixed representations of the access relation are also
possible: we might be given partial information about adjacency
lists, about the user and resource hierarchies, or information about
equivalence of some users or some resources. This may arise in
specifications, and one could be asked to reconstruct the entire unified hierarchy from these data.
In a distributed environment, partial information about the access relation or the unified hierarchy will be distributed among the
users and the resources; no central authority is needed (except may
be at the set-up of the system or for occasional maintenance and
updates).
In the next three subsections we give schemes for enforcing an
access relation.

3.2. Certificate-based schemes
In these schemes a trusted certificate authority (CA) distributes certificates to users. When a user accesses a resource the protocol is
as follows: the user provides an access request along with a certificate. The resource then verifies the user’s access right based on this
certificate (without consulting the CA).
It is natural to assume that users know which resources they can
access. A user ut may have a certificate of the following form for
each resource r j that 21%can access:
[ u t ’ s ID, ( u , . r 3 ) , c e r t . - v a l i d - t i m e , CA-sig. ]
Here, u2’sID identifies the user, ( U , , r j ) indicates the access right,
and the CA’s digital signature certifies to the resource that the information in the certificate is correct. We refer to books on cryptography for more information on certificates and digital signatures (e.g.,
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~91).
Alternatively, instead of having a different certificate for each
resource that u2 can access, ut might have just one certificate that
lists all of R(u,)(i.e., all the resources accessible tow,%).This approach may be simpler when the number of resources is small; but
it gives more information to a resource than this resource needs to
know.
In any case, no information about the access relation or the hierarchies needs to be stored in the resources.
A disadvantage of this scheme comes from a general problem
with certificates: it is hard to keep certificates up to date when the
system changes (the revocation problem - see [9]).

3.3. Unconditionallysecure keying schemes
In this approach every vertex U in the unified hierarchy has a key
IC,. Moreover, depending on the unified hierarchy order 5 , each
user at v knows a set of keys U, C {kW : w 5 U } (i.e., the user
knows some keys of lower-ranking resources), and each resource at
vertex U knows a set of keys R, C {kW : U 5 w} (i.e., some: keys
of higher-ranking users); the sets U, and R, should be chosen in
such a way that

vi 5

v j if and only if

U,, r l Rut # 0.

Moreover, the sets U, and R, should be such that one cannot guess
any key contained in any of these sets. In particular, we assume that
the keys IC, are long enough so that they cannot be guessed.
When a user uj (at vertex v j ) requests a resource ri (at vertex
vi) he presents his set U U jto the resource; the resource then checks
whether Uvj n Rv7 # 0, which holds if and only if vi 5 v j , iie., if
and only if u3 has the right to access ri. (In this protocol, a resource
can get information about the keying material held by users; this
could however be avoided by adding ‘challenge-response’ methods
into the protocol - see [9].)
We will illustrate this approach by simple special cases, namely

‘user multiple keying’, ‘resource multiple keying’, and ‘mixed keying’.

User multiple keying:
In this scheme we have for every vertex U : R, = {k,} and
U, = { k V 3 : vj i v } .
This scheme can also be implemented by directly using the access relation: Then for every resource r and every user U we have
R, = {k,} and U, = {IC,? : U can access r j } .
A user U requesting access to a resource r presents U, to r. The
resource r verifies U’S access right by checking whether IC, E U,.
For example (see Figure 4), U,, = { I C Z , k 4 , ICs}, R?,* =
{ k z } . R,, = { h }R,,
, = {kg}, therefore user U P can access
resources r z , r 4 ,and 7-5.
Resource multiple keying:
This scheme is similar to User multiple keying, with the roles
of user and resources switched.
Mixed keying:
This is the general case. For example (see Figure 5 ) , U,, =
{ k1 , kg}, and R,, , R,, , R,, , J1U6 contain the key k l , so the user
at vertex VI can access the resources at V Z , 213,214, 216, and he can
also access the resource at 215 because they share k5. One can check
from the graphs that 21% 5 vj if and only if R,, n U,, # 0

R-sets

U-sets

Figure 4: User multiple keying

4. CONCLUSION
We showed that three hierarchies can be extracted from an access
relation: a user hierarchy, a resource hierarchy, and a unified hierarchy. These hierarchies allow compact specifications of access
control, and are useful for schemes that enforce an access relation.
Cryptographic key-based hierarchical schemes can be designed to
effectively enforce and implement access control in distributed environments. Other issues such as general dynamic access control
and specification of negative access relations are challenging problems which we plan to investigate in the future.
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